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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN YOUNG and STELLA
YOUNG, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
10774

GEORGE BRIDWELL,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellants have appealed a Judgment of the
District Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, dismissing Appellants' action for malpractice and breach of contract against the Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Appellants filed suit against Respondent
for breach of contract and malpractice as a lawyer.
The Complaint alleged five alternative causes of
aetion and sought $15,000.00 damages. An Answer
wa~ filed and discovery processes followed. On 17
March, 1966, pretrial was had before J uclge Joseph
1

G. Jeppson. Another pretrial was had April 5, 1966, '
and on 28 October, 1966 hearing was held before
Judge Stewart M. Hanson who entered Judgment
for the Respondent and dismissed Appellants' cause
of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Judgment of the trial court should be affinned.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record in the instant case is composed of
the pleadings and papers in the trial below and the
record and pleadings in case number 132929, Marv in C. Young, et al. vs. F. Hyde Mortensen, et al., ,
in the District Court of Salt Lake County.'
The Appllants' Complaint alleged that the Respondent had been employed as counsel for Appellants to bring an action for breach of a lease, tl~ 1.rn
ages, and for eviction and restoration of leased
p1·emises ( R. 1). It was alleged that the Appellants
had hired Respondent personally and exclusively
( R. 2). It was alleged that Appellants had a cause
of action against Respondent because he did not
personally represent them as they had contracted '
in the case of Marvin C. Young, et al. vs. F. Hyde '
Mortensen, et al. (R. 1-3). The Complaint set forth
five alternative claims for relief ( R. 1) ; however,
'The record of that case will be cited by using the prefix A.
Page citations will not be cited since they are not numbered
by the clerk.
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the Appellants now contend that the trial court
erred on two grounds so that consideration of all
the issues of the Complaint is not necessary for determination of this appeal.
Marvin and Stella D. Young filed lawsuit
against F. Hyde Mortensen, et al. (A. 1) . They
discharged their original counsel before trial (A)
and employed Respondent. A Notice of Readiness
for Trial was filed by Alan D. Frandsen, an attorney associated with Respondent. Respondent proceeded to prosecute the suit which involved a dispute over a lease (A). The lease agreement which
was the subject of the litigation was for five years,
from August 6, 1957 to August 6, 1962 (A attachment to Complaint). The lawsuit was pre-tried
before Judge A. H. Ellett November 30, 1962, after
the expiration of the original term of the disputed
lease ( R. 10). Prior to the expiration of the lease,
the Defendants Mortensen served Notice on the
Youngs of their intention to renew the lease at the
same rental (A). Thereafter, Mortensens paid
$150.00 per month to Youngs, which was accepted.
The lease, however, had a clause calling for renewal
of the lease at a negotiated figure and Youngs sent
a letter prior to expiration calling for $450.00 per
month (A).
At the time of pretrial November 30, 1962,
Alan D. Frandsen appeared as attorney for the
Youngs. An additional issue was raised at pretrial
as to whether the payment of the $150.00 per month
3

by the Mortensens after the expiration of the lease
'
and the acceptance of those payments by the Youngs
wol'ked to renew the lease. The pretrial order reflects the fallowing ( R. 10) :

I
1

"3. Since the 10th day of August, 1962, I
the defendants have regularly paid to the I
Plaintiffs the sum of $150.00 per month, and
the Plaintiffs have accepted the same towards
payment of rent.
(THE COURT: Mr. Frandsen, you say
that you don't know about other payments
but that the Plaintiff did accept the first payment after August 10, 1962?
MR. FRANDSEN: I believe so."
The Pre-Trial Judge then ruled (R. 10) :
1

"The court will hold as a matter of law
that there has been a renewal of the lease on
the same terms as heretofore existed; that the
acceptance of the payment of the rent after
the exercise of the option would constitute a
renewal of the lease for a period of five years
as contained in the option within the lease." '
At the trial January 7, 1963, before Judge
Ellett, the appellants were represented by Alan D.
Frandsen (Tr. of A-p.1). No objection to Mr.
Frandsen's representation of the Youngs was ever
voiced by them (Tr. of A). Ml'. Frandsen again
challenged the court's ruling made at pre-trial (Tr.
of A-p.1, 2). Further, the court dismissed Mr.
Young's action as he did not have an interest in the

1
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leased premises (Tr. of A-p.16)." The trial court,
after hearing the evidence, ruled Mrs. Young had
no cause of action, and awarded the Mortensens
judgment on their Counterclaim (A). No appeal
was taken from that judgment. The judgment entered February 26, 1963 does not recite that the
lease was renewed at the same rate that was in force
but only dismissed the Plaintiffs' Complaint "no
cause of action" and awarded the Defendants
$340.09, the amount requested in their Counterclaim
(A). The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
did conclude that receipt of payment of rental operated as a waiver of the Plaintiff's right to negotiate
a new rental and the lease was renewed for fi\·e
years (A); however, its relevance absent a judgment was apparently only the Appellants' claim of
a right to rescind. Subsequently, Youngs' Motion
for new trial was made with different counsel. It
does not appear what disposition was made of this
Motion, but it was apparently denied.
At pretrial in the instant action, the court ruled there was no evidence of any negligence on the
part of Mr. Frandsen ( R. 25). At the hearing, the
trial court concluded that an appeal in Civil No.
182929 would have been of "no avail" ( R. 35).
The only issues raised on appeal, as the basis
for reversal, are: ( 1) That the court erred in not
'i\fr. Young is not properly a party to this action or this
appeal, and was stricken as a party Plaintiff in the instant
action ( R. 23).

5

considering the Appellants' breach of c o n tr act \
theory, and (2) The Court erred in ruling the results would not have been different on appeal.
3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN R E J E C T I N G APPELLANTS
THEORY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT:
A. THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME
AND THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF ALAND. FR'ANDSEN, AND
THEREFORE APPELLANTS SUSTAINED
NO DAMAGE.
E. APPELLANTS WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF
BREACH BY PROCEEDING TO TRIAL
WITHOUT OBJECTION.

The Appellants contend initially that the court
erred in the pretrial order in not ruling that they
had a cause of action because the Respondent failed '
to handle their case and thereby breached his contract. It is submitted the trial court acted properly. '
It is well settled that where a client seeks dam·

ages from his attorney for malpractice or breach
of contract he has the burden of sustaining his cause
of action as well as his damages, Collins vs. Wanner,
382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963); Anno. 45 ALR 2d 5, 14.
'The appellants have Jt,eferred to depositions in their brief.
However, these are not a part of the record on appeal a!1d
there is no evidence that they were considered by the tnal
court.
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It was incumbent upon Appellants to demonstrate
the breach and the damages. The record is silent on
the issue except for the pretrial order. However,
assuming that the Appellants hired Mr. Bridwell
and not the association of Bridwell and Frandsen,
the trial court found not negligence on the part of
Mr. Frandsen in handling the case, and Appellants
have not objected to that ruling. No evidence supports the conclusion that the damages the Appellantsnow seek would have been avoided. Mr. Frandsen diligently pursued the court's ruling at the time
of trial on the lease problem seeking to change the
result. The trial indicated he was convinced of his
position "as a matter of law". In no way is it explained how the Respondent's appearance and argument of the ma~r in place of Mr. Frandsen would
have changed the trial court's ruling. After judgment was entered in Civil No. 132929, additional
counsel sought to set aside the judgment and was
, not successful. Appellants now seek damages they
contend resulted from the breach. Appellants do
, not seek return of a fee, but contend, in effect, that
the trial court erred and that they are entitled to
the damages flowing from that error. There is no
evidence whatsoever that the damages they seek
are the proximate result of the breach by Respondent. Appellants really are seeking special damages
for the alleged breach, and in such circumstances it
is basic law that the damages must be shown to have
occurred due to the breach of the employment conti·act. Hadley vs. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 [1854] ;
7

McCormick, Damages §§ 138, 139. There is no show.
ing that if Respondent had perforrned Appellant's position would be any different. There being
no negligence on the part of Frandsen and no indication that Respondent's performance would have
c..:hanged the result, the trial court correctly disregarded the claim of breach of contract. See Anno.
45 ALR 2d 5, 30.
4

Since the record reveals that Appellants went
to trial with Mr. Frandsen without any objection
or protest they have waived any right to contend
Respondent was the sole counsel. There is a presumption that an attorney appearing for a party
is authorized to appear and the contrary fact must
be shown by clear and convincing proof. 7 Arn. Jur.
2d, Attorneys at Law § 113, 116. Nothing appears
of record to support the Appellants' contention
Frandsen was not authorized to represent them. No
objection was made at trial that Respondent alone
was Appellants' counsel. It has been acknowledged
by this Court that a client may ratify or acquiesce
in the employment of associate counsel, Skeen vs.
Peterson, 113 Utah 483, 196 P.2d 708 (1948). Sup·
porting a claim of ratification or acquiescence in
this case is the fact of Frandsen preparing and sign·
ing the Notice of Readiness for Trial (A), his appearance at pretrial and his conduct of the trial,
' Respondent does not admit that the Appellants' factual contentions are true but only assui.e,es the H f
H' : statements for this appeal.
1
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' the fact that Judgment was entered in Civil No.
132929 on 26 February, 1963, Satisfaction of Judgment made on 4 December, 1963, and the fact that
the Motion to Strike the Judgment and for a new
hearing was not made by new counsel until 24 January, 1964. These facts would tend to support a
claim of acquiescence and ratification, Re Laacivita,
255 F.2d 365 (3rd Cir. 1958); Yarnall vs. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192
(1952), and when weighed against the presumption
of authority and the absence of rebutting evidence
of record, it is clear Appellants have no claim for
breach of contract.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' ACTION.
A. RESPONDENT HAD NO DUTY TO AP-

PEAL.

B. RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT COULD NOT
BE DEEMED NEGLIGENT IN VIEW OF
THE STATE OF THE LAW IN UTAH.
C. IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE CASE WOULD HA VE
BEEN REVllSED ON APPEAL.

The Appellants' second contention is that Respondent should have advised them that the trial
court's decision in Civil No. 132929 could be appealed. This contention is inappropriate when examined in light of the facts in the instant case, and
9

that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that .
the trial court committed prejudicial error.
I

I

It is well settled in this state that an attorney I
is under no obligation to pursue an appeal on behalf
of his client unless there has been some agreement
or indication from the client that the attorney is
to represent him on appeal. In Lundberg vs. Backman, 11 Utah 2d 330, 358 P.2d 987 ( 1961), this
court ruled that an attorney hired to represent a
party in a lawsuit was not obligated to undertake
an appeal on behalf of the party absent an additional agreement encompassing such representation.
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that
there was ever any discussion between the Appellants and Respondent relative to prosecuting an
appeal. The Appellants' Complaint filed in the trial
court expressly states that Appellants hired Respondent for the purposes of prosecuting an action in
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. Under these circumstances Respondent had
no obligation towards the Appellants with reference
to an appeal. As this court noted in the Backman
case:

"Before Mr. Backman could be liable for
failure to perfect an appeal in time, he would
have to owe to her a duty to prosecute s~ch
an appeal for her. This duty does not arise
from mere employment of Mr. Backman by
Appellant to represent her in defense of a case
in the District Court."
IO

This court recognized that the obligation of an
attorney terminates with the entry of the judgment
in Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093.
Since the Backman case seems to recognize that
there was no duty flowing from Appellants to Respondent with an appellate process, it is submitted
that there was no duty upon the Respondent to make
an appraisal as to the likelihood of a successful appeal, in the absence of a request by the client that
he do so. In Hawkeye Security Insurance Company
vs. Indemnity Insurance Company, 260 F.2d 361
(10th Cir. 1958), the court noted that the determination of whether an appeal should be taken is a
question for the prinicpal, or the client. This being
so, in the absence of some request on behalf of the
client for the attorney's advice relevant to taking
an appeal, the attorney is under no oblf.tion or duty
to volunteer such advice.
It is submitted that even if the court were to

determine that in some instances an attorney was
under an obligation to appraise his client as to appeal possibilities in the absence of a request by the
client, this is not such a case. The Appellants in
Point II of their brief cite no decisions from the
State of Utah controlling or relevant to the issues
they claim were incorrectly decided in the trial
court. Further, as it will be seen later on, there appears to be a division of authority that might be applicable to the instant case. An attorney is not ob' ligated to know with exactness the law, and certain11

ly where there is no decision from the highest coun
in the state it cannot be assumed that he can make
a positive statement that a client should pursue an
appeal on penalty of being found guilty of rnalprac- ,
tice. As Chief Justice Abbott noted in M ontriou vs.
Jefferies, 2 C & P 113 ( 1825) :
"No attorney is bound to know all the
law. God forbid that it should even be imagined that an attorney or a counsel or even a
judge is bound to know all the law."
As noted inHodges vs. Carter, 239 N.C. 517,
80 S. E. 2d 144 (1954):
"An attorney who acts in good faith and
in an honest belief that his advice and acts
are well founded and in the best interest of
his client is not answerable for a mere error
of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law
which has not been settled by the court of last
resort in his State and on which reasonable
doubt may be entertained by well-informed
lawyers."

•
.
.

·

A similar conclusion was reached in Collins vs.
Wanner, 382 P.2d 105, (Okla. 19"J.)It is submitted,
therefore, that in the absence of a request by the
Appellant for an appraisal of the chances on appeal or in the absence of a clear-cut holding from
this court that reversal was in order, the Respon·
dent owed no diity to advise the Appellants in the
manner they claim they should have been advised.

I

It is well settled that an attorney, like .a do?tor,
is not an insurer of a good result for his client,

!
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Babbitt vs. Bompas, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417
(1889) ; 45 ALR 2d 5, 12, 13. Even if it could be
said an attorney employed under an agreement for
the prosecution of the trial of a case owes a duty to
the client relating to an appeal, the facts of this
case do not show any negligence. In 45 ALR 2d 5,
15, it is observed:

"In accordance with the general rule discussed supra, § 3 [a], that an attorney is liable only for the possession of ordinary and
reasonable skill and knowledge, it has frequently been held that a lawyer is not liable
for lack of knowledge as to the true state of
the law where a doubtful or debatable point
is involved.')
A lead case is Spangler vs. Sellers, 5 Fed. 882,
887 (C.C.SD. Ohio 1881) where the court clearly
stated the standard of care applicable to attorneys.

"It did not require of him the possession
of perfect legal knowledge, and the highest
degree of skill in relation to business of that
character, nor that he would conduct it with
the greatest degree of diligence, care, and
prudence. But it required that he should possess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill
common to members of the profession; and
that, in the discharge of the duties he had
assumed, he would be ordinarily and reasonably diligent, careful and prudJIBt."
In Roady and Andersen, Professional Negligence, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence
(Wade) P.222, it is observed:
"There has been universal agreement
13

that a lawyer is not an insurer or guarantor
of the correctness of his work or of the results which will be attained. He is liable only
for negligent failure to use the requisite care
or skill."
and p. 225:
"On the other hand if the state of the
law is uncertain or doubtful, or if there is a
disagreement among attorneys ~hen it is
very unlikely that an attorney will be found
negligent. In this connection, it may be relevant that the lower court agreed with the
attorney or that he sought the advice of another attorney before taking his action.''

Some cases have indicated that an attorney
cannot be deemed negligent by relying on the trial
court or magistrate's assertion of the law, Pearson
vs. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 259 (1858); Hart vs.
Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193, 7 Eng. Rep. 670 (H.L. Sc.
1839). It is submitted therefore in the absence of
a special duty to analyze the law in this case relative to appeal it could not be said that Respondent
was negligent. 5 Therefore, it cannot be claimed the ,
Respondent's conduct in this case relative to advising or not advising Appellants to appeal was negligence.
!

Of relevance to the issues of duty, negligence,
and causation is the question of whether the de·
• One District Judge, now a Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the trial Judge that heard this case feel that the law
was sufficiently against Appellants' position to preclude
recovery.

14
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cision of the trial court would have been reversed
with certaintly on an appeal in No. 132929. As the
Appellants correctly note in their brief, in any event
they must demonstrate that the decision in No.
132929 would have been reversed on appeal. Pete vs.
Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78
(1954); Better Homes, Inc. vs. Rodgers, 195 F.
Supp. 93 (D.C. W. Va. 1961).
The facts in No. 132929 viewed most favorably
to Respondent show that the lease read:
"The Lessee shall have the option to extend said lease for an additi'onal five years,
from August 10, 1962 to August 10, 1967,
on the same terms and conditions as in the
original lease, except the rental payment
thereof. In the event that the parties hereto
cannot agree upon the rent to be paid for the
extended option period, then the rental shall
be submitted to arbitration. Each of the parties hereto shall select an arbitrator and these
two arbitrators shall select a third to determine the said rental. The rental determined
by the said board of three arbitrators shall
be binding upon both parties hereto."
Note the lease refers to extended period and
provides for arbitration if agreement can't be reached, thus lending emphasis to a position that the lease
was really a 10-year lease with a right to terminate
after five years. Prior to the expiration of the lease,
on July 23, 1962 (A) Respondent sent a letter to
Mr. and Mrs. F. Hyde Mortensen advising them
that Appellants wanted $450.00 per month for the
15

next five years or Mortensens should quit the premises. On July 30, 1962, Mr. Bernard L. Rose, representing Mortensens, replied that they elected to
continue their lease at $150.00 per month and indicated they would seek arbitration. Thereafter, Appellants accepted the $150.00 payments and never
name an arbitrator nor apparently requested arbitration. In Civil No. 132929 the court concluded this
acceptance of rent at the old amount resulted in a
renewal at the same terms.
'The Appellants cite cases to the effect that allowing the lessee to retain possession and accepting
rents does not renew the lease. These cases are not
aplicable. Here, the timely election of the Mortensens continued the lease, not the hold over and acceptance of rents. The Court found lessees not otherwise in default, and the Appellants do not contest
this aspect of the court's finding in Civil No.
132929. A reading of the cases cited by Appellants
amply demonstrates they are inapplicable here. The
question then is: Was the acceptance a renewal at
the $150.00 figure? Since Appellants accepted the
rents as paid by Mortensens, a clear basis existed
for holding a renewal was intended. In Tay-Holbrook, Inc. vs. Tutt, 24 P.2d 463 (Cal. 1933), the
court held that by holding over and accepting rent,
the formalities for renewal of a lease, called for in
the lease, were waived.
The conduct of the Appellants would clearly in·
dicate a waiver of their right to arbitrate. Stephen
16

vs. Union Assurance Society, 16 Utah 22, 50 Pac.
626 (1897); 5 Am. Jur. 2d. Arbitration and Award
§§ 51-53. It is submitted, therefore, the trial court's
decision in Civil No. 132929 is not clearly erroneous,
nor that of the court below in the case now before
this court, and Respondent was not guilty of negligence.
CONCLUSION
The Appellants' contentions when examined in
light of the evidence and the law indicate only that
they are dissatisfied with the results of their lawsuit. There is no basis to say the court below erred,
and this court should affirm the trial court judgment dismissing the lawsuit.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR.
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent
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